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Abstract—Discriminating DDoS flooding attacks from flash 
crowds poses a tough challenge for the network security 
community. Because of the vulnerability of the original design 
of the Internet, attackers can easily mimic the patterns of 
legitimate network traffic to fly under the radar. The existing 
fingerprint or feature based algorithms are incapable to detect 
new attack strategies. In this paper, we aim to differentiate 
DDoS attack flows from flash crowds. We are motivated by the 
following fact: the attack flows are generated by the same pre-
built program (attack tools), however, flash crowds come from 
randomly distributed users all over the Internet. Therefore, 
the flow similarity among DDoS attack flows is much stronger 
than that among flash crowds. We employ abstract distance 
metrics, the Jeffrey distance, the Sibson distance, and the 
Hellinger distance to measure the similarity among flows to 
achieve our goal. We compared the three metrics and found 
that the Sibson distance is the most suitable one for our 
purpose. We apply our algorithm to the real datasets and the 
results indicate that the proposed algorithm can differentiate 
them with an accuracy around 65%. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is a tough challenge of identifying DDoS attacks when 
hackers mimic the normal Internet traffic pattern or hide 
attack flows in legitimate traffic. Because of the 
vulnerability of the Internet, it is easy for hackers to spoof 
source IP addresses of attack packets [24], verifying the 
pattern of attack flows [14][6], etc. In general, DDoS 
detection methods include activity profiling [12][21], 
sequential change-point detection [2][3][7][26], wavelet 
analysis [1], chi-square/entropy detector [12][16], and so 
on. All these methods are based on the features or 
fingerprints of specific DDoS attacks. Unfortunately, it is 
very easy for hackers to mimic these features to fool user 
detection methods. For example, because of the open 
architecture of the Internet, hackers can spoof the source IP 
addresses of attack packets according to the real Internet IP 
address distribution to against our source address 
distribution based detection algorithms [11][28]; hackers 
can change the TTL value of the attack packets according to 
the real hop distance between zombies and victim 
respectively in order to against our hop-count detection 
methods [27][28]; in order to fly under the radar, attackers 
may also mimic the behaviors of flash crowds [4][7], a 
sudden increase of legitimate traffic, e.g. many fans will 
access the official website when an important match is 
ongoing; many people will check CNN website when 
breaking news comes. 
DDoS attacks and flash crowds share similar behaviors, 
and we have to differentiate them effectively, otherwise, we 
may raise false alarms. In fact, it is a big challenge for 
defenders to discriminate DDoS flooding attacks from flash 
events [4][7][15], and the consequences are serious if we 
can not discriminate them. On one hand, attackers can 
mimic the traffic features of flash crowds to disable our 
detectors. On the other hand, our detectors may treat the 
legitimate flash crowds as DDoS attacks. Research [15] 
tried to use three dimensions: traffic patterns, client 
characteristics and file reference characteristics, to 
discriminate flash crowds from DDoS attacks. 
Unfortunately, this counter attack method cannot follow the 
ever changing attack methods, as the attack patterns are 
changing from time to time, and the attacker may mimic the 
network traffic patterns of flash crowds, causing the 
detector to be disabled quickly. The entropy detector 
mentioned in the survey [4] came from reference [12], 
which can raise the alarm for a crowd access, however, it 
cannot discriminate DDoS attacks from the surge of 
legitimate accesses, e.g. flash crowds. Reference [7] tried to 
separate flash crowds from DDoS flows using the change-
point detection method, but this method can be cheated 
easily, e.g. zombies can increase the number of attack 
packets very slowly, which will almost surely disable the 
change point detectors.  
Distance measurement of traffic flows is an effective 
way to discriminate DDoS attack flows from flash crowds. 
As we know, zombies use pre-built programs to pump 
attack packets to the victim, as a result, the similarity 
among attack flows are much higher than the similarity 
between random legitimated flash crowds. Some researches 
have been done on solving the similarity problem using 
stochastic methods in frequency domain [9][17]. Cheng et 
al. [9] mapped DDoS attacks from time domain to 
frequency domain, and then transformed it to power 
spectral density to identify the DDoS attacks. Spectral 
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analysis [8] employed digital signal processing method to 
expose the hidden shrew DDoS attacking packets. 
Reference [17] used data mining technology to dig the 
DDoS attack information, but it is costly in terms of 
computing and delay. Our previous work [29] explored the 
similarity methodology preliminarily, and the effectiveness 
of the proposed method is confirmed. Reference [25] used 
Hellinger distance to detect VoIP floods in peer-to-peer 
networks. 
In this paper, we employ three abstract distance metrics, 
the Jeffrey distance, the Sibson distance, and the Hellinger 
distance [18], to measure the similarity among network 
flows. A flow is defined as the packets which are passing a 
router and the packets share the same destination address. 
When a DDoS alarm is raised, we start to sample the 
suspicious flows, and measure the similarity among the 
flows using the previously mentioned metrics. If the 
distance among the flows is sufficiently small, in other 
words, they are similar enough, we claim them as DDoS 
attack flows. Otherwise, it is flash crowds. 
The major contributions of this paper are as follows: 
• We present the three distance measure metrics, and 
we found that the Sibson metric is the best among 
them for our discrimination purpose. 
• The proposed strategy is scalable and practical. The 
cooperating routers can be any routers in the Internet, 
rather than in an ISP network or a community 
network. We can conduct our detection with only two 
cooperative routers on the Internet, which is much 
easy to achieve in the Internet. The attack packets 
could be discarded far before they reach the victim 
according to the proposed methodology. 
• The proposed method is independent from any 
specific DDoS flooding attack tools. It therefore can 
detect any forthcoming new attack fashions actively.  
• The proposed algorithm is tested by real datasets, 
and we can differentiate DDoS flooding attacks from 
flash crowds with accuracy around 65%. 
 
The remaining of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents the background and the three metrics for 
distance measurement. In Section 3, we define the problem 
and specify our goal. Section 4 then explains the design of 
the discrimination algorithm. The performance analysis of 
the three metrics is conducted in Section 5, as well as the 
real dataset experiments for the proposed algorithm. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and point out the 
future work. 
 
II. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Launching DDoS Attacks 
DDoS attacks target on exhausting the victim's 
resources, such as network bandwidth, computing power, 
operating system data structures, and so on. To launch a 
DDoS attack, malicious users first establish a network of 
computers that they will use to generate the volume of 
traffic needed to deny services to computer users. To create 
this attack network, attackers discover vulnerable sites or 
hosts on the network. Vulnerable hosts are usually those 
that are either running no antivirus software or out-of-date 
antivirus software, or those that have not been properly 
patched. Vulnerable hosts are then exploited by attackers 
who use the vulnerability to gain access to these hosts. The 
next step for the intruder is to install new programs (known 
as attack tools) on the compromised hosts of the attack 
network. The hosts running these attack tools are known as 
zombies, and they can carry out any attack under the control 
of the attacker. Many zombies together form what we call 
an army [22]. 
There are two categories of DDoS attacks, typical DDoS 
attack and DRDoS attacks. In a typical DDoS attack, the 
army of the attacker consists of master zombies and slave 
zombies. The hosts of both categories are compromised 
machines that have arisen during the scanning process and 
are infected by malicious code. The attacker coordinates 
and orders master zombies and they, in turn, coordinate and 
trigger slave zombies. More specifically, the attacker sends 
an attack command to master zombies and activates all 
attack processes on those machines, which are in 
hibernation, waiting for the appropriate command to wake 
up and start attacking. Then, master zombies, through those 
processes, send attack commands to slave zombies, 
ordering them to mount a DDoS attack against the victim. 
In that way, the agent machines (slave zombies) begin to 
send a large volume of packets to the victim, flooding its 
system with useless load and exhausting its resources.  
Unlike typical DDoS attacks, in DRDoS attacks the 
army of the attacker consists of master zombies, slave 
zombies, and reflectors [13]. The scenario of this type of 
attack is the same as that of typical DDoS attacks up to a 
specific stage. The attackers have control over master 
zombies, which, in turn, have control over slave zombies. 
The difference in this type of attack is that slave zombies 
are led by master zombies to send a stream of packets with 
the victim's IP address as the source IP address to other 
uninfected machines (known as reflectors), exhorting these 
machines to connect with the victim. Then the reflectors 
send the victim a greater volume of traffic, as a reply to its 
exhortation for the opening of a new connection, because 
they believe that the victim was the host that asked for it. 
The defense against DDoS attacks is a catch-me-if-you-
can game. From the beginning, all legitimate users have 
tried to respond against these threats. Researchers from 
academia and industry have proposed a number of methods 
against the DDoS threat. The basic discrimination is 
between preventive [5][22] and reactive [23] defence 
mechanisms. Despite the efforts, the DDoS attacks still pose 
a huge threat. Attackers manage to discover new 
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weaknesses of computer systems and communication 
protocols when existing weaknesses have been patched up, 
and—what is worse—they also exploit the defence 
mechanisms in order to develop attacks to overcome these 
mechanisms or exploit them to generate false alarms and to 
cause catastrophic consequences. 
 
B. Metrics for Distance Measures 
We discuss three metrics for distance measures for 
network traffic flows based on literature in this section. 
There are two categories in this kind of measurement: a) 
measure based on information theory, and b) measure of 
affinity [18]. For category a), the original measure is called 
Kullback-Leibler distance [10]. For the given two flows 
with probability distributions )(xp and )(xq , the Kullback-
Leibler distance is defined as follow: 
 ∑
∈
⋅=
χx xq
xp
xpqpD )(
)(log)(),(  (1) 
Where χ  is the sample space of x . It is obvious that 
),(),( pqDqpD ≠ , if )()( xqxp ≠ . As the result, the 
previous equation cannot be a measure. Jeffrey distance 
fixes this asymmetric using combination of the Kullback-
Leibler distance, which is defined as follows: 
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A further measure for this category is the Sibson distance 
detailed as follows. 
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The category b) originally came from Bhattacharyya’s 
measure of affinity, ∑
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used for this category is the Hellinger distance, which is 
defined as follows: 
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It is necessary that we choose the most suitable metrics for 
specific purposes, e.g. measure the similarity among 
network flows to discriminate DDoS attack flows. 
 
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
We consider a very simple network diagram shown as 
Figure 1, it could be any part of the Internet, which is under 
control or cooperation of defenders. There are three routers, 
21, RR and 3R , and two traffic flows pf  and qf , which goes 
through router 2R and 3R  respectively, and the flows merge 
at router 1R . The dash lines in the diagram mean that the 
routers may not immediately connect with each other, in 
other words, the routers probable separate far away from 
each other. 
 
R1 
R3 
R2 
 fq 
fp 
server
 
 
Figure 1. A sample network with two traffic flows. 
 
 
Let )(xp  and )(xq  to represent the flow probability 
distribution of flow pf  and qf , respectively, and χ  be the 
finite sample space for the flows. Moreover, )(xp  and 
)(xq  are N-tuples ),...,,( 21 Nppp  and ),...,,( 21 Nqqq , 
Nipi ,...,2,1,0 =≥ , Niqi ,...,2,1,0 =≥ , and ∑
=
=
N
i
ip
1
1 , 
∑
=
=
N
i
iq
1
1 .  
 
In this paper, our goal is to measure the similarity among 
the flows, for example pf  and qf  in Figure 1, to 
differentiate DDoS attack flows from flash crowds. 
 
 
IV. THE DISCRIMINATION ALGORITHM DESIGN 
 
In this section, we describe the design of the 
discrimination algorithms, and present the details of the 
algorithm. 
When there is a surge of network flows, we are not sure 
whether it is DDoS attack or flash crowds. We name the 
surge flows as suspicious flows at the moment, and the 
cooperating routers will activate the discrimination 
algorithm to make the decision further.  
Once the discrimination process is activated, the 
cooperating routers start to sample the suspicious flows for 
a sufficient time slot t, and the sampling is repeated until 
there are sufficient samples for decision making. The 
cooperative routers, e.g. router 2R and 3R  in Figure 1, will 
exchange data when the sampling process is done. Then the 
routers can calculate the similarity of the flows 
independently using anyone of the previous mentioned 
metrics (we use the Sibson distance in this paper). If the 
distance is smaller than a given threshold, then the flows are 
DDoS attack flows, otherwise, the flash crowds. 
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The discrimination algorithm is detailed as follows: 
 
The Discrimination Algorithm  
1. Identify the suspicious flow,
if , on a router i (i>1), and 
initialize sample slot t, sample size n, and the discrimination 
threshold δ . 
2. Take samples on flow if  until the sample size n≥ , therefore, 
we obtain samples of number of packets as i
n
ii xxx ,...,2,1 . 
3. Calculate the probability distribution of the flow 
as
1
1
)(
−
=






⋅= ∑
n
k
i
k
i
k
i
xxxp , noted as )(xp .  
4. Router j will obtain its probability distribution of the flow 
as
1
1
)(
−
=






⋅= ∑
n
k
j
k
j
k
j
xxxp , noted as )(xq . 
5. Exchange )(xp and )(xq between router i and j.  
6. The distance between )(xp and )(xq is calculated at router 
i and j independently using the Sibson distance metric, and 
noted as ),( qpD s .  
7. If δ≤),( qpD J , it is a DDoS attack and discard the 
related packets; otherwise forward the packets to the 
destination. 
8. Go to step 2. 
 
Figure 2. The discrimination algorithm 
 
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS ON METRICS 
 
A. Metric Performance Analysis 
In order to find out which metric is the most suitable one 
for flow similarity measurement for DDoS attacks, we 
conducted a number of simulations carefully. In general, 
people believe that the Internet traffic obeys the Normal 
distribution pattern or the Poisson distribution pattern. 
Moreover, any distribution can also be represented by 
combination of a series of normal distributions with 
different parameters. Therefore, we examine the attributes 
of the three metrics using Normal distribution and Poisson 
distribution, respectively. There are two critical attributes 
that we use to compare the metrics: accuracy and 
sensitivity. 
We arrange two flows with Normal distribution, 
1,10 == σµ , and the three distance metrics are applied to 
these two flows to measure the information distance. The 
simulation is conducted for 100 times, and the results are 
shown in Figure 3. On the other hand, we did the same 
simulation on two Poisson distribution flows with 10=λ , 
and the results are shown in Figure 4. 
For two flows share the same distribution and 
parameter(s), the distance between them suppose to be zero 
in terms of statistics. From Figure 3 and Figure 4, we found 
that the Sibson’s information radius is the best measure 
among the metrics in terms of accuracy. 
In order to examine the metrics’ sensitivity to traffic 
flows variations, two more simulations have been 
performed. We first investigate the metrics’ sensitivity 
against standard variations of Normal distribution flows 
with 10=µ and σ  that varies from 0.1 to 3.0, namely 1% 
to 30% variation from the mean. The results are shown in 
Figure 5. 
 
Figure 3. The measurements of two normal flows 
( 1,10 == σµ ) 
 
Figure 4. The measurements of two Poisson flows ( 10=λ ) 
 
Figure 5. The metric sensitivity of normal flows ( 10=µ ) against 
standard variation 
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 Figure 6. The metric sensitivity of Poisson flows against arrival rate 
 
For the Poisson flows, we examine the metric sensitivity 
against arrival rate, which varies from 5 to 12. The results 
are shown in Figure 6. 
Based on Figure 5 and 6, we found that the Sibson’s 
information radius is the least sensitive metric among the 
three metrics. The simulations demonstrated that it is quite 
stable for the change of parameters for both standard 
variation of Normal flows and arrival rate of Poisson flows. 
 
B. Performance Evaluation of the Discrimination 
Algorithm 
In this section, we examine the performance of the 
proposed discrimination algorithm against the real datasets. 
We use the NLANR PMA Auckland-VIII dataset [20] as 
the flash crowds, and the MIT LLS DDOS 1.0 intrusion 
dataset [19] as DDoS attack dataset. For each dataset, we 
count the number of packets which is addressed to the 
server (for flash crowds) or the victim (for DDoS attacks), 
the sample interval is 100 ms, and the size of samples is 
200. 
We processed the flows with the three metrics the 
Hellinger distance, the Jeffrey distance, and the Sibson 
distance respectively. The results are shown in Figure 7, 8 
and 9 respectively.  
Following the results of Figure 7, 8 and 9, we conclude 
two preliminary findings: 
• The proposed strategy can differentiate DDoS attack 
flows and flash crowds more than 65% (13 out of 20) 
of the time. 
• The Sibson distance is best metric among the three 
metrics for discriminating DDoS attack flows from 
flash crowds.  
 
Figure 7. Similarity measure with the Hellinger distance 
 
 
Figure 8. Similarity measure with the Jeffrey distance 
 
 
Figure 9. Similarity measure with the Sibson distance 
 
VI. SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK 
 
In this paper, we proposed the discrimination algorithm 
to differentiate DDoS attack flows from flash crowds 
employing information distance to fulfil the task. We 
presented three metrics for information distance measures, 
the Jeffrey distance, the Hellinger distance, and the Sibson 
distance. Our simulations and real data experiments indicate 
and confirm that the Sibson distance is the best metric 
among the previously mentioned metrics for flow distance 
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measure. Moreover, the proposed discrimination algorithm 
can identify DDoS attacks flows from flash crowds with an 
accuracy around 65% in the real dataset experiments. 
Our future work focus on the follows: improving the 
accuracy of the flow based discrimination strategy with 
more side information, such as other independent attack 
features; extend the experiments to a large scale to observe 
the performance of the discrimination algorithm. 
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